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I. Introduction 
The open economy literature has always shown ample interest in the effects of monetary 
policy on output, employment and the current account. The traditional literature used the 
Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model in order to work out the various implications of a variety of 
policy issues for an open economy. Although this approach is still widely used, it has been 
criticized for its lack of microfoundations.  
The seminal papers which consider policy issues in an optimizing framework are by 
Obstfeld (1981a, 1981b). He assumes that instantaneous utility is a function of consumption and 
real money holdings, as in Sidrauski (1967). Also, as in Uzawa (1968), the rate of time 
preference is an increasing function of instantaneous utility. In his (1981b) paper he considers 
the policy effects for such an economy when the central bank fixes the rate of growth of money. 
However, the results in Obstfeld (1981a) reveal that the analysis is considerably simplified if 
one, instead, assumes that the central bank fixes the rate of devaluation of the domestic currency. 
He shows that in that setting, with perfectly flexible prices, a once and for all devaluation will 
not have any effect. On the other hand, an increase in the rate of devaluation will lead to a sharp 
fall in consumption and real money holdings in the short run, leading to a current account 
surplus. After that, both consumption and real money holdings increase along the adjustment 
path to the new steady state equilibrium. 
These important contributions can be criticized on three grounds. First, as the model 
deals with an endowment economy, it precludes any discussion of the effects of monetary policy 
on employment, output, and investment which were the focus of the literature using the Mundell-
Fleming-Dornbusch model. Second, the money-in-the-utility-function is used in a relatively 
narrow set of subfields in Macroeconomics. The cash-in-advance (CIA) approach to introducing   2
money into a model is more widely used, especially in the empirical asset pricing literature. 
Third, Uzawa preferences have sometimes been criticized for their assumption that the rate of 
time preference in an increasing function of instantaneous utility, which is necessary for the 
stability of the steady state for a small open economy.
1 Obstfeld uses Uzawa preferences for the 
following reason. In an infinite horizon model with endowments and a small open economy for a 
steady state to exist one should assume that the rate of time preference is equal to the world rate 
of interest. This assumption then precludes any dynamics for an endowment economy: after a 
disturbance the economy jumps to its new steady state.  
The present paper attempts to deal with these three weaknesses.  We use an infinite 
horizon model in which the representative household can make labour/leisure decisions.  We also 
allow for investment decisions by the firms, subject to adjustment costs.  We assume that 
households face a CIA constraint on their expenditures.
2 In this setting, changes in the inflation 
rate will change the price of consumption relative to leisure. This, by changing the labour input 
in the production process, changes the marginal productivity of capital, and, hence, investment. 
                                                           
1   It has been argued by some authors that this assumption is “arbitrary and even counter-
intuitive” (Svensson and Razin, 1983, p.45 ).  Blanchard and Fischer (1989, pp. 74-75) warn 
their reader that "the Uzawa function with its assumption (that the rate of time preference in 
increasing in instantaneous utility) is not particularly attractive as a description of preferences 
and is not recommended for general use." 
2  Other related papers which employ CIA constraints in an open economy setting in order to 
study policy issues include Calvo and Vegh (1994, 1995) and Edwards and Vegh (1997).  Calvo 
and Vegh do not allow for endogenous output in their (1995) paper. In their (1994) paper they 
allow for output endogeneity through a Phillips curve, without labour/leisure choice or capital.  
Edwards and Vegh (1997) allow for labour/leisure choice but not for capital or investment.  They 
also do not derive the full adjustment dynamics.  In the present paper, however, we shall derive 
the full adjustment dynamics.  We will see that capital and investment play a crucial role in the 
adjustment of the model.  The focus of the papers cited above are also very different from the 
current paper’s. 
 
   3
With adjustment costs for investment the economy adjusts slowly to its long run equilibrium. 
The dynamics of the model are, thus, rich enough even with a fixed rate of time preference.
3 
In accordance with Obstfeld (1981a), Calvo (1981) and Djajic (1982), it is assumed that 
the central bank targets the rate of change of the exchange rate (not the rate of growth of money 
per se).
4 This precludes complicated, yet no so crucial, off steady state effects, similar to those 
analyzed by Fisher (1979). It, thus, reduces the dimensions of the dynamic system corresponding 
to the model, facilitating the use of simple phase diagrams.
5 It is well known that the steady state 
policy effects are the same, regardless of whether the central bank fixes the rate of growth of 
money or the inflation rate.
6  
We show that an unanticipated permanent increase in the rate of depreciation of the 
domestic currency (i.e., the domestic inflation rate) will lead to a fall in consumption, as with 
CIA constraint on consumption higher inflation increase the price of consumption. The 
                                                           
3   The model has much in common with Sen and Turnovsky (1989a, 1989b) and Turnovsky and 
Sen (1991). They, however, abstract completely from money and monetary policy. 
4    This assumption is consistent with the assumptions in the literature concerned with the time 
consistency of monetary policy (e.g., Kydland and Prescott (1977), Backus and Drifill (1985), 
and Walsh (1995)), where it is also assumed that the central bank targets the inflation rate (not 
the rate of growth of money per se).  Recently, Mishkin (2000) also argued that the central banks 
of most developed as well as emerging countries do indeed target the inflation rate rather than 
the rate of growth of money.   
 
5    When the central bank targets the rate of growth of money, instead, the rate of change of the 
exchange rate (i.e., the inflation rate) will be endogenous, and variable off the steady state.  It is 
this fact which increases the dimension of the dynamic system, and precludes the use of simple 
phase diagrams. 
6    Hence, the assumption that the central bank targets the rate of change of the exchange rate 
implies that the central bank may possibly be intervening on the foreign exchange market to 
some extent only during the adjustment period before the steady state.  Also, as we will see, instead 
of intervening on the foreign exchange market the central bank could adjust the rate of growth of money 
appropriately.     4
representative household substitutes leisure for consumption, reducing labour supply. The 
resulting fall in labour input in the production process reduces the marginal productivity of 
capital, leading to a fall in investment. With investment adjustment costs, capital adjusts slowly 
towards its long run level. As capital falls during the adjustment period, it reduces wages, and 
labour supply. Hence, along the adjustment path consumption falls, as the representative 
household substitutes leisure for consumption.  
From this, one can also derive the adjustment of output and the current account in 
response to a permanent unanticipated increase in the rate of depreciation of the domestic 
currency.  The fall in labour input reduces output on impact.  Nevertheless, the current account 
goes into a surplus as the fall in consumption and investment dominate the fall in output.  Along 
the adjustment path output falls, as both capital and labour input fall.  The current account also 
continues to be in surplus until the steady state is reached.   
We also derive the effects of an anticipated permanent, and an unanticipated temporary 
increase in the rate of depreciation of the domestic currency.  In particular, it is shown that an 
unanticipated temporary increase in the rate of depreciation of the domestic currency, as with the 
unanticipated permanent increase, leads, on impact, to a fall in consumption, an increase in 
labour supply, a fall in investment, a fall in output, and a current account surplus. Such 
temporary changes in exchange rate policies have long term effects. The reason, basically, is that 
the model has two predetermined variables (capital and the net foreign asset position of the 
country). This means that the initial values of these predetermined variables determine the 
position of the stable path of the model.
7 Hence, the values of these predetermined variables at 
                                                           
7  This is because of hysteresis, or history dependence, which has also been emphasized by Sen 
and Turnovsky ( 1989a, 1989b, 1990). 
   5
the time the policy is revised, dictate the position of the new stable path. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section II. The 
effects of exchange rate policies are presented in section III. Some concluding remarks are made 
in section IV. 
II.  The Model 
The model has a lot in common with Sen and Ternovsky (1989a,b), in which money is 
completely left out of the model.  The preferences of the representative household are given by  








where c is his consumption, l his labor supply and β  his (fixed) rate of time preference.  The 
utility function has the following properties: 
, 0 ) , ( > l c Uc   U   , 0 ) , ( 0 ) , ( < l c l , < l c cc U  0 ) , ( < l c ll U  and U .    0
2 > − cl ll cc U U
Money is introduced into the model through a cash in advance constraint on consumption 
expenditures.  Hence, at any point in time the household requires real money balances ( ) in 
order to finance his expenditures: 
t m
t t c m ≥                         ( 2 )    
All domestic firms are owned by the representative household, who receives all their 
profits  t π .  The representative household also receives monetary transfers from the government 
which has a real value of  t τ .  He faces the flow budget constraint 
t t t t t t t t t t m c rb l w b m ε τ π − − + + + = + & & ,                   (3) 
where  is the wage rate, b  the value of internationally traded bonds he holds,  t w t t ε  the inflation 
rate and r the interest rate, which is fixed abroad.  Thus, the household’s asset accumulations   6
) ( t t b m & & + is equal to his net income ( ) t t t t t rb l w τ π + + +  minus his consumption and the inflation 
tax.   
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Now define the household’s total accumulable assets as a ) ( t t t b m + ≡ .  Then 
 and (3) can be re-written as   t b &
t t t t c l w ra − + + + = τ π                    (4) 




rta e                          ( 5 )  
and the initial condition given by his initial asset holdings  .     0 a
As money does not yield utility directly, and as the return on bonds completely dominate 
the return on money, it follows that equation (2) will always hold with strict equality – i.e.,   is 
residually determined once c  is chosen.  Thus, setting 
t m
t t t c m =  in equation (4) we can write the 
Hamiltonian for the household’s problem as 
wl l c U
h ) , ( π λ + + + = ,                  
where λ is a co-state variable. 
The optimality conditions for this problem are: 
0 =
h
c  ⇒  1 ( ) , ( λ = l c c U                      (6) 
0 =
h
l  ⇒ U w l c l λ − = ) , (                        ( 7 )  
λ & = −
h
a H   ⇒                       (8)  β λ − ( r




t a e Lim λ
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Note that as β  and r  are both fixed, from equation (8) for a steady state to exist we will 
require  β = r .  This is a standard assumption made in the literature and it implies that λ  is 
always at its steady state level, λ .   
Now consider the problem of the representative firm.  It has the standard neo-classical 
constant return to scale production function with capital and labor as inputs: 
) , ( t t t l K F Y =                      ( 1 0 )  
where,      , 0 ) , ( > l K FK , , 0 ) , ( 0 ) , ( > l K Fl < l K FKK  0 ) , ( < l K Fll  and    0
2 = − Kl ll KK F l F
The profit function ( t π ) net of investment expenditures is  
) ( ) , ( t t t t t t I l w l K F Φ − − = π                    ( 1 1 )  
where Φ  is total costs associated with the investment  :  ) (I t I
) ( ) ( I I I Ψ + = Φ                     ( 1 2 )  
where  are the adjustment costs associated with  .  The function  ) (I Ψ t I ) (I Ψ  is assumed to be a 
non-negative convex function of investment.  This convexity implies  0 ≥ Φ′  and Φ   By 
choice of units we may set   ;  
. 0 > ′ ′
0 ) 0 ( = Ψ 0 ) 0 ( = Ψ′ , which implies that 0 ) 0 ( = Φ  and  . 1 ) 0 ( = Φ′    
The firm’s problem will be to maximize the present value of its profits. 






t π [] ∫
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− Φ − −
0
) ( ) , ( dt e I l w l K F
rt
t t t t t
Subject to                      ( 1 4 )   t t I K = &
and the initial condition  .  0 K
Dropping the time subscripts, the Hamiltonian for this problem is
8  
                                                           
8 Here, q is a co-state variable, also known as ‘Tobin’s q’.   
   8
qI I wl l K F H
f + Φ − − = ) ( ) , (                   ( 1 5 )  
The optimality conditions for this problem are  
0 =
f
l H   ⇒                      ( 1 6 )   w l K Fl = ) , (
0 =
f
I H   ⇒   Φ                    ( 1 7 )   q I = ′ ) (
q H qr
f
k & = −   ⇒   q                   ( 1 8 )   ) , ( l K F qr K − = &
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Finally, consider the government side of the model.  The role played by the government 
is kept as simple as possible.  The government controls the real lump sum transfer (τ ) such that 
the inflation rate ε  is kept at a constant level.  Hence,
9 
τ ε = + m m & .                      ( 2 0 )  
We are now in a position to study the equilibrium for this economy, by which we mean a 
state of equality between the planned demand and supply derived from the optimization  
problems for households and firms for given government policies.  Combining the optimality 
conditions of households and firms, and the government budget constraint (20) we obtain the 
following set of equations: 
) 1 ( ) , ( ε λ + + = r l c U c                   ( 2 1 )  
) , ( ) , ( l K F l c U l l λ − =                     ( 2 2 )  
                                                           
9  An implicit assumption here is that we have a flexible exchange rate system in which the 
foreign exchange reserves of the government are constant.  Of course, the government could 
alternatively target the inflation rate by intervening on the foreign exchange market.  As argued 
in the introduction, such intervention on the foreign exchange market may be necessary only 
along the idjustment path to the steady state, because in steady state ε is equal to the rate of 
growth of money.     9
q I = Φ′ ) (                     ( 2 3 )  
) ( ) , ( I wl l K F Φ + + = π                    ( 2 4 )  
) , ( l K F qr q k − = &                     ( 2 5 )  
I K = &                       ( 2 6 )  
) ( ) , ( I c rb l K F b Φ − − + = &                    ( 2 7 )  
We can solve (21) and (22) for c and l to obtain 
                        ( 2 8 )  
                   ( 2 9 )  
) , , ( ε λ K c c =
) , , ( ε λ K l l =
The partial derivatives of private consumption demand and labor supply implicit in (28) 
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2 > − + = cl ll ll cc U F U U D λ .  
Now substituting (29) into (25), we obtain 
)) , , ( , ( ε λ K l K F qr q k − = &                    ( 3 0 )  
Next, note that from equation (23) we can write  ) (q I I =  (where  ).  Substituting 
this into equation (26) we obtain 
0 ) ( > ′ q I  10
) (q I I K = = &                      ( 3 1 )  
As λ  is always at its steady state level, equations (30) and (31) give us a system of 
differential equations which can be solved for   and  .  Linearizing these equations around 
the steady state equilibrium results in the following differential equation system 
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1
12 Φ′ ′
= a   [] k kl kk l F F a + − = 21 , and  r a = 22 .  Also, K
~
 and q ~ are steady state 
values of K  and  .  Since the determinant of the matrix of the coefficients in equation (32) is 
negative ( ), the long run equilibrium exhibits saddle point stability with the 
saddle path given by  
q
22 21 < − a a 0 22 11a a
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t µ ~
( ~ − Φ′ ′ + = ,                      ( 3 4 )  
where  µ  is the negative eigenvalue of the coefficient matrix in (32).  
  Combining (33) and (34) we obtain   
)
~
( ~ K K q q − Φ′ ′ + = µ ,                     ( 3 5 )  
which is the negatively sloping schedule XX in Figure 1.
10 
                                                           
10 The following comments with respect to Figure 1 are in order. First, from (30) and (31) it is 
clear that in the Figure the  will be upward sloping and the   will be horizontal. 
Second, again, from (30) and (31) it is clear that 
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   11
To determine the dynamics of the current account first consider both household’s and 
government’s budget constraints (4) and (20) and use the definition of profit (π ) given in 
equation (11), in order to obtain the current account balance of the economy 
) ( ) , ( I c rb l K F b Φ − − + = & .                    ( 3 6 )  
Now substitute for c  and   from (28) and (29) into (36) and linearize the resulting 
equation around the steady state, noting that 
t t l
λ λ = t  always, to obtain   
)
~
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We know in a steady state  0
~
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must be related for saddle point 
stability.
11 
                                                           
11 Also note that (40) ensures that the No Ponzi Game condition (5) is satisfied.  To see this 
multiply both sides of (39) by   and then let 
rt e
− ∞ → t .  It would then be clear that without (40) 
condition (5) would not be satisfied.     12
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This is the equation of the negatively sloping schedule ZZ in Figure (2.B).  This schedule 
describes the relationship between K  and b  along the stable path of the complete model.  One 
important point to note is that, as both K  and b  are predetermined variables, the position of ZZ 
depends very much on the initial conditions ( .  In particular, if the initial conditions of 
another country are such that it does not start on ZZ, then that country will end up at a different 
steady state equilibrium.  The model, therefore, exhibits hysteresis.    
) 0 b , 0 K
III.  The Effects of Exchange Rate Policies 
In this section we discuss the effects of a permanent unanticipated, a temporary 
unanticipated and an anticipated permanent changes in the rate of depreciation of domestic 
currency ε  on the important macroeconomic variables.  As in Obstfeld (1981a), a once and for 
all depreciation of the domestic currency will not have any effect, as all prices are fully flexible.   
A. A Permanent Unanticipated Increase in Inflation 
We first consider the steady state effects of an increase in ε .  The steady state is given by 
equations (6), (7), (16), (17), and by (14), (30) and (36) with  .  Noting that 
, these equations can be written completely as  
0 = = = b K & & q &
1 ) 0 ( = Φ′
) 1 ( )
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In order to provide the intuition for these results, we first work out the transition path to 
the new steady state.  Suppose that the initial equilibrium is at points A and B in Figures 2.A and 
2.B, respectively. From (50), (52) and (54) it is clear that the increase in ε will shift the XX 
schedule to the left, and it will leave the ZZ schedule unaffected. Hence, immediately after the 
increase in ε  there will be a sharp decline in q(point J in Figure 2.A). After this there will be a 
fall in K  and an increase in   as the equilibrium moves along  b X X ′ ′  and ZZ to the long run 
equilibrium at   and  A′ B′.  
The intuition for these results is as follows. With CIA constraints on consumption, the 
increase in ε  increases the cost of consumption relative to leisure. Thus, the representative 
household reduces his labour supply. This results in a fall in q and in investment, as it reduces 
the marginal productivity of capital.
12  The fall in labour supply also results in a fall in output.  
Despite the fall in output the current account turns into a surplus (b rises) as consumption and 
investment have both fallen. 
One can easily derive the adjustments of employment, consumption and output as we 
move to the new steady state equilibrium. With l  and  0 > k 0 < k c , along the adjustment path 
labour supply falls and consumption rises. The reason is that the fall in capital reduces the real 
                                                           
12     Note that q is the present value of the dividend payments on a unit of capital (the market 
value of capital) divided by the replacement cost of capital (which is unity in terms of the 
consumption good). Hence, changes in current and expected future marginal productivities of 
capital will affect q. If q falls below 1 we will have  , and if q rises above 1 we will have 
, as in Tobin's q theory of investment. 
0 < K &
0 > K &  15
wage. This reduces labour supply, and increase leisure taken by the representative household. 
Thus, the representative household substitutes leisure for consumption along the adjustment path.  
B.  A Temporary Increase in Inflation 
Suppose initially the economy is in a steady state with the inflation rate at  0 ε , along with 
the corresponding capital stock   and net foreign bonds  . At time 0, the inflation rate is 
raised from 
0 K 0 b
0 ε to  1 ε . It is understood that at time T>0, the inflation rate will be reverted to its 
initial value.  The mathematical details of the effects of such a temporary increase in ε  are 
available upon request. It is relatively straightforward to explain the effects using the phase 
diagrams we have already derived.  
If the increase in ε  is expected to be only temporary then q will fall by a smaller amount 
than with a permanent increase in ε . The reason is that it will be expected that the labour supply 
will increase in the future, when the policy is reversed, which will then tend to increase the 
marginal productivity of capital.
13  Hence, when the policy is implemented at time 0 the 
equilibrium jumps from A to D in Figure 2.A, and between times 0 and T the economy moves 
along the unstable trajectory DH.  As K and b are both predetermined, the implementation of the 
policy at time 0 does not affect the instantaneous equilibrium in Figure 2.B.  However, while the 
economy moves along the trajectory DH in Figure 2.A, the equilibrium in Figure 2.B moves 
along BF.  Intuitively, along DH there is less capital decumulation than there would have been 
had the increase in ε  been permanent (along  X X ′ ′ ); and, moreover, this capital decumulation 
                                                           
13   Recall, from footnote 9, that q is the present value of the dividend payments on a unit of 
capital (the market value of capital) divided by the replacement cost of capital (which is unity in 
terms of the consumption good).   16
tends to decelerate as we get closer to the date the policy will be reversed.  As a result the 
trajectory BF deviated from ZZ as shown in Figure 2.B.   
When the policy is reversed at time T, KT and bT dictate the position of the stable path 
from then on. This is  Z Z ′ ′  in Figure 2.B.  As KT < K0 and bT > b0 the new steady state 
equilibrium level of K will be less than K0 , and the new steady state level of b higher than b0. 
This implies that in Figure 2.A the saddle path for time T will be  X X ′ ′ ′ ′ , with a steady state level 
of K less than K0, and a steady state level of q the same as  (unity).  The new steady state 
equilibrium will be given by points L and N in Figure 2.A and 2.B, respectively.   
0 q
Hence, in the new steady state equilibrium after a temporary increase in ε  the economy 
will have a lower level of capital and a better net foreign asset position. The model exhibits 
hysteresis.  When the economy moves along the trajectory BF, in Figure 2.B, the combinations 
of capital and bonds which are held by the households change. As capital affects the wage rate 
while bonds do not, the temporary change in the combination of the households’ assets affects 
their long run budget constraint, as described by the ZZ schedules in Figure 2.B. 
C. An Anticipated Permanent Increase in Inflation 
             Finally, note that an anticipated permanent increase in ε , with the government 
announcing at time 0 that it will permanently increase ε  at time T, will have the same effects as 
an unanticipated temporary fall in ε .  The effects of an anticipated permanent increase in ε  will, 
therefore, be the reverse of what was discusses above.    
  Consider Figures 3.A and 3.B, where initially the economy in equilibrium at A and B, 
respectively.  The announcement of the policy at time 0 will reduce q instantly, as it is 
anticipated that the future increase in the inflation rate will reduce the marginal productivity of 
capital. Clearly, q will fall by a smaller amount than if the announcement and implementation of   17
the policy coincided. Hence, when the intentions of the government regarding its future policies 
is announced at time 0 the equilibrium jumps from A to N in Figure 3.A, and between times 0 
and T the economy moves along the unstable trajectory NQ.  As K and b are both predetermined, 
the implementation of the policy at time 0 does not affect the instantaneous equilibrium in Figure 
3.B. However, while the economy moves along the trajectory NQ in Figure 3.A, the equilibrium 
in Figure 3.B moves along BS. Intuitively, along NQ there is less capital decumulation than there 
would have been had the policy been implemented at time 0 rather than at T (along  X X ′ ′ ); and, 
moreover, the capital decumulation accelerates as we get closer to the actual implementation 
time for the policy. As a result the trajectory BS deviated from ZZ as shown in Figure 3.B.  
When the policy is actually implemented at time T, KT and bT dictate the position of the 
stable path from then on. This is  Z Z ′ ′ ′ ′  in Figure 3.B. This implies that the saddle path for time T 
on in Figure 3.A will be  X X ′ ′ ′ ′ . After time T the economy moves along  X X ′ ′ ′ ′ and  Z Z ′ ′ ′ ′ to the 
new steady state equilibrium at points F and G, respectively.  
The degree of capital decumulation between times 0 and T is less than what it would have 
been had the policy been implemented at the same time that it was announced (at time 0). Also, 
as the model exhibits hysteresis, the new steady state level of capital is larger than it would have 
been had the policy been implemented at time 0. 
IV.  Conclusions 
Two very distinct models have been used in the literature in order to analyze the effects 
of monetary policies in open economies. On the one hand, the aggregative Mundell-Fleming-
Dornbush model has been used to analyze the effects of monetary policies on employment, 
output, investment, the current account, and other macroeconomic variables. On the other hand, 
intertemporal utility maximizing models have employed endowment economies, or models with   18
relatively incomplete production structures, in order to analyze the effects of monetary policies 
on, mainly, consumption, real money holdings and the current account. This paper has made an 
attempt to study the effects of exchange rate policies in an intertemporal optimising model with 
employment, investment and output effects.   
We have employed an infinite horizon model in which the representative agent has 
labour/leisure choice, and firms can make investment decisions. Money is introduced into the 
model through a CIA constraint on consumption. A permanent unanticipated increase in the 
inflation rate increased the price of consumption in terms of leisure. This reduced consumption 
and labour supply, as the representative agent substituted leisure for consumption. The resulting 
fall in labour input reduced output and the marginal productivity of capital, leading to a fall in 
investment. Despite the fall in output, the current account turns into a surplus because of the fall 
in consumption and investment. The model also showed that during the transition period to the 
new steady state there were further falls in consumption and labour supply, as the reduction in 
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Figure 1: The Phase Diagram    22
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Figure 2: The Effects of an Increase in ε - Temporary vs. Permanent   23
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Figure 3: The Effects of an Anticipated Increase in ε   24
 
 